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Excerpts requested and furnished for the defendants by order of Court from the testimony of former SECRETARY OF STATE CORDELL HULL given at hearing held before Joint Congressional Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, same being found in Volumes 7 and 9 of Report of Proceedings, IPS Document No. 2007:

(Vol. 7, pp. 1088-1089)

In the fall of 1937 our Government was confronted with the decision whether to apply the Neutrality Act to the hostilities between China and Japan. It was clear that the arms embargo authorized by the Act would hurt China and help Japan, since China needed to import arms and Japan manufactured a large supply. The President used the discretion provided by law and refrained from putting the Act into operation.

On July 26, 1939, our Government notified the Japanese Government of its desire to terminate the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911. It was felt that this treaty was not affording adequate protection to American commerce either in Japan or in Japanese occupied portions of China, while at the same time the operation of the most-favored-nation clause of the treaty was a bar to the adoption of retaliatory measures against Japanese commerce. The treaty therefore terminated on January 26, 1940, and the legal obstacle to our placing restrictions upon trade with Japan was thus removed.

Beginning in 1938 our Government placed in effect so-called "moral embargoes" which were adopted on the basis of humanitarian considerations. Following the passage of the Act of July 2, 1940 restrictions were imposed in the interests of national defense on an ever-increasing list of exports of strategic materials. These measures were intended also as deterrents and expressions of our opposition to Japan's course of aggression.

(Vol. 7, pp. 1089-1090)

Throughout this period the United States increasingly followed a policy of extending all feasible assistance and encouragement to China. This took several different forms including diplomatic actions in protest of Japan's aggression against China and Japan's violation of American rights. Loans and credits aggregating some two hundred million dollars were extended in order to bolster China's economic structure and to facilitate the acquisition by China of supplies. And later lend-lease and other military supplies were sent to be used in China's resistance against Japan.

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(Vol. 7, p. 1091)

During these years we had kept before the Japanese all these doctrines and principles in the most tactful and earnest manner possible, and at all times we had been careful not to make threats. I said that I had always felt that if a government makes a threat it ought to be ready to back it up. We had been forthright but we had been as tactful as possible.

(Vol. 7, pp. 1101-1102)

We had in mind doing everything we could to bring about a peaceful, fair, and stabilizing settlement of the situation throughout the Pacific area. Such a course was in accordance with the traditional attitudes and beliefs of the American people. Moreover, the President and I constantly had very much in mind the advice of our highest military authorities who kept emphasizing to us the imperative need of having time to build up preparations for defense vital not only to the United States but to many other countries resisting aggression. Our decision to enter into the conversations with the Japanese was, therefore, in line with our need to rearm for self-defense.

The President and I fully realized that the Japanese Government could not, even if it wished, bring about an abrupt transformation in Japan's course of aggression. We realized that so much was involved in a reconstruction of Japan's position that implementation to any substantial extent by Japan of promises to adopt peaceful courses would require a long time. We were, therefore, prepared to be patient in an endeavor to persuade Japan to turn from her course of aggression. We carried no chip on our shoulder, but we were determined to stand by a basic position, built on fundamental principles which we applied not only to Japan but to all countries.

(Vol. 7 pp. 1114-1115)

Accordingly, on July 26, 1941, President Roosevelt issued an executive order freezing Chinese and Japanese assets in the United States. That order brought under the control of the Government all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Chinese or Japanese interests were involved. The effect of this was to bring about very soon virtual cessation of trade between the United States and Japan.

On August 6 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal which he said was intended to be responsive to the President's proposal regarding neutralization of Indo China.

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(PP. 1114-1115, Cont.)

In essence, the Japanese proposal was that:

1. The Japanese Government should undertake to refrain from stationing troops in regions of the southwest Pacific, to withdraw from French Indochina after "settlement of the China incident," to guarantee Philippine neutrality, and to cooperate in the production and procurement of natural resources in east Asia essential to the United States; and

2. The United States should undertake to "suspend its military measures in the southwestern Pacific areas" and to recommend similar action to the Governments of the Netherlands and Great Britain, to cooperate in the production and procurement of natural resources in the Southwestern Pacific essential to Japan, to take measures to restore normal commerce between the United States and Japan, to extend its good offices toward bringing about direct negotiations between Japan and the Chungking Government, and to recognize Japan's special position in Indochina even after withdrawal of Japanese troops.

Vol. 7, pp. 1119-1120)

On September 6 Prime Minister Konoe in a conversation with the American Ambassador at Tokyo indicated that the Japanese Government fully and definitely subscribed to the four principles which this government had previously set forth as a basis for the reconstruction of relations with Japan. However, a month later the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated to the American Ambassador that while those four points had been accepted "in principle," certain adjustments would be necessary in applying these principles to actual conditions.

(Vol. 7, p. 1133)

In telegrams of November 3 and November 17, the American Ambassador in Japan cabled warnings of the possibility of sudden Japanese attacks which might make inevitable war with the United States.

(Vol. 7, pp. 1136-1165)

VI. JAPANESE ULTIMATUM OF NOVEMBER 20 AND OUR REPLY

On November 20th the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu presented to me a proposal which on its face was extreme. I knew, as did other high officers of the Government, from intercepted Japanese messages supplied to me by the War and Navy Departments, that this proposal was the final Japanese proposition -- an ultimatum.

(Vol. 7, pp. 1136-1165, Cont.)

The proposal read as follows:

"1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indochina where the Japanese troops are stationed at present.

"2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

"In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final agreement.

"3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.

"4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets.

"The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.

"5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China."

The Plan thus offered called for the supplying by the United States to Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing measures, for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China, and for withdrawal of moral and material support from the unrecognized Chinese Government. It contained a provision that Japan would shift her armed forces from southern Indochina to northern Indochina, but placed no limit on the number of armed forces which Japan might send into Indochina and made no provision for withdrawal of those forces until after either the restoration of peace between

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Japan and China or the establishment of an "equitable" peace in the Pacific area. While there were stipulations against further extension of Japan's armed force into southwestern Asia and the southern Pacific (except Indochina), there were no provisions which would have prevented continued or fresh Japanese aggressive activities in any of the regions of Asia lying to the north of Indochina--for example, China and the Soviet Union. The proposal contained no provision pledging Japan to abandon aggression and to revert to peaceful courses.

On November 21, Mr. Kurusu called alone upon me and gave me a draft of a formula relating to Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact. That formula did not offer anything new or helpful. I asked Mr. Kurusu whether he had anything more to offer on the subject of a peaceful settlement as a whole. Mr. Kurusu replied that he did not.

On November 21 we received word from the Dutch that they had information that a Japanese force had arrived near Palao, the nearest point in the Japanese Mandated Islands to the heart of the Netherlands Indies. Our Consuls at Ha Noi and Saigon had been reporting extensive new landings of Japanese troops and equipment in Indochina. We had information through intercepted Japanese messages that the Japanese Government had decided that the negotiations must be terminated by November 25, later extended to November 29. We know from other intercepted Japanese messages that the Japanese did not intend to make any concessions, and from this fact taken together with Kurusu's statement to me of November 21 making clear that his Government had nothing further to offer, it was plain, as I have mentioned, that the Japanese proposal of November 20 was in fact their "absolutely final proposal."

The whole issue presented was whether Japan would yield in her avowed movement of conquest or whether we would yield the fundamental principles for which we stood in the Pacific and all over the world. By mid-summer of 1941 we were pretty well satisfied that the Japanese were determined to continue with their course of expansion by force. We had made it clear to them that we were standing fast by our principles. It was evident, however, that they were playing for the chance that we might be overawed into yielding by their threats of force. They were armed to the teeth and we knew they would attack whenever and wherever they pleased. If by chance we should have yielded our fundamental principles, Japan would probably not have attacked for the time being--at least not until she had consolidated the gains she would have made without fighting.

There was never any question of this country's forcing Japan to fight. The question was whether this country was ready to sacrifice its principles.

To have accepted the Japanese proposal of November 20 was clearly unthinkable. It would have made the United States an ally of Japan in Japan's program of conquest and aggressions and of collaboration with Hitler.

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Hitler. It would have meant yielding to the Japanese demand that the United States abandon its principles and policies. It would have meant abject surrender of our position under intimidation.

The situation was critical and virtually hopeless. On the one hand our Government desired to exhaust all possibilities of finding a means to a peaceful solution and to avert or delay an armed clash, especially as the heads of this country's armed forces continued to emphasize the need of time to prepare for resistance. On the other hand, Japan was calling for a showdown.

There the situation stood -- the Japanese unyielding and intimidating in their demands and we standing firmly for our principles.

The chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically vanished. We had reached the point of clutching at straws.

Three possible choices presented themselves.

Our Government might have made no reply. The Japanese warlords could then have told their people that the American Government not only would make no reply but would also not offer any alternative.

Our Government might have rejected flatly the Japanese proposal. In that event the Japanese warlords would be afforded a pretext, although wholly false, for military attack.

Our Government might endeavor to present a reasonable counter-proposal.

The last course was the one chosen.

In considering the content of a counter-proposal consideration was given to the inclusion therein of a possible modus vivendi. Such a project would have the advantages of showing our interest in peace to the last and of exposing the Japanese somewhat in case they should not accept. It would, if it had served to prolong the conversations, have gained time for the Army and Navy to prepare. The project of a modus vivendi was discussed and given intensive consideration from November 22 to November 26 within the Department of State, by the President, and by the highest authorities of the Army and Navy. A first draft was completed on November 22 and revised drafts on November 24 and 25. It was also discussed with the British, Australian, Dutch and Chinese Governments.

The projected modus vivendi provided for mutual pledges by the United States and Japan that their national policies would be directed

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toward lasting peace; for mutual undertakings against advances by military force or threat of force in the Pacific area; for withdrawal by Japan of its armed forces from southern Indochina; for a modification by the United States of its freezing and export restrictions to permit resumption of certain categories of trade, within certain specified limits, between the United States and Japan; for the corresponding modification by Japan of its freezing and export restrictions; and for an approach by the United States to the Australian, British and Dutch Governments with a view to their taking similar measures. There was also an affirmation by the United States of its fundamental interest that any settlement between the Japanese and Chinese Governments be based upon the principles of peace, law, order, and justice. There was provision that the *modus vivendi* would remain in force for three months and would be subject to further extension.

It was proposed as a vital part of the *modus vivendi* at the same time to give to the Japanese for their consideration an outline of a peace settlement which might serve as a basis for working out a comprehensive settlement for the Pacific area along broad and just lines. On November 11 there had been prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs for possible consideration a draft of a proposal along broad lines. This draft like others was drawn up with a view to keeping the conversations going (and thus gaining time) and to leading, if accepted, to an eventual comprehensive settlement of a nature compatible with American principles. This draft proposal contained statements of general principles, including the four principles which I had presented to the Japanese on April 16, and a statement of principles in regard to economic policy. Under this draft the United States would suggest to the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they enter into peace negotiations, and the Japanese Government would offer the Chinese Government an armistice during the period of the peace negotiations. The armistice idea was dropped because it would have operated unfairly in Japan's favor.

A further proposal to which I gave attention was a revision in tentative form made by the Department on November 19 of a draft of a proposed comprehensive settlement received from the Treasury Department on the previous day. This tentative proposal was discussed with the War and Navy Departments. In subsequent revisions points to which objections were raised by them were dropped. A third proposal which I had under consideration was that of the *modus vivendi*.

What I considered presenting to the Japanese from about November 22 to November 26 consisted of our *modus vivendi* draft and an outline of a peace settlement which might serve as a basis for working out a comprehensive settlement for the Pacific area along broad and just lines. This second and more comprehensive part followed some of the lines set forth in the November 11 draft and in the November 19 draft.

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While the modus vivendi proposal was still under consideration, I emphasized the critical nature of this country's relations with Japan, at the meeting of the War Council on November 25. The War Council, which consisted of the President, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, was a sort of clearing house for all the information and views which we were currently discussing with our respective contacts and in our respective circles. The high lights in the developments at a particular juncture were invariably reviewed at these meetings. At that meeting I also gave the estimate which I then had that the Japanese military were already poised for attack. The Japanese leaders were determined and desperate. They were likely to break out anywhere, at any time, at any place, and I emphasized the probable element of surprise in their plans. I felt that virtually the last stage had been reached and that the safeguarding of our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy.

In a message of November 24 to Mr. Churchill, telegraphed through the Department, President Roosevelt added to an explanation of our proposed modus vivendi the words, "I am not very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon."

On the evening of November 25 and on November 26 I went over again the considerations relating to our proposed plan, especially the modus vivendi aspect.

As I have indicated, all the successive drafts, of November 22, of November 24 and of November 25 contained two things: (1) the possible modus vivendi; and (2) a statement of principles, with a suggested example of how those principles could be applied -- that which has since been commonly described as the 10 point proposal.

I and other high officers of our Government knew that the Japanese military were poised for attack. We knew that the Japanese were demanding -- and had set a time limit, first of November 25 and extended later to November 29, for --acceptance by our Government of their extreme, last-word proposal of November 20.

It was therefore my judgment, as it was that of the President and other high officers, that the chance of the Japanese accepting our proposal was remote.

So far as the modus vivendi aspect would have appeared to the Japanese, it contained only a little chicken feed in the shape of some cotton, oil and a few other commodities in very limited quantities as compared with the unlimited quantities the Japanese were demanding.

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It was manifest that there would be widespread opposition from American opinion to the modus vivendi aspect of the proposal especially to the supplying to Japan of even limited quantities of oil. The Chinese Government violently opposed the idea. The other interested governments were sympathetic to the Chinese view and fundamentally were unfavorable or lukewarm. Their cooperation was a part of the plan. It developed that the conclusion with Japan of such an arrangement would have been a major blow to Chinese morale. In view of these considerations it became clear that the slight prospects of Japan's agreeing to the modus vivendi did not warrant assuming the risks involved in proceeding with it, especially the serious risk of collapse of Chinese morale and resistance and even of disintegration of China. It therefore became perfectly evident that the modus vivendi aspect would not be feasible.

The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect that they were being encircled. On the one hand we were faced by this charge and on the other by one that we were preparing to pursue a policy of appeasing Japan. In view of the resulting confusion, it seemed important to restate the fundamentals. We could offer Japan once more what we offered all countries, a suggested program of collaboration along peaceful and mutually beneficial and progressive lines. It had always been open to Japan to accept that kind of a program and to move in that direction. It still was possible for Japan to do so. That was a matter for Japan's decision. Our hope that Japan would so decide had been virtually extinguished. Yet it was felt desirable to put forth this further basic effort, in the form of one sample of a broad but simple settlement to be worked out in our future conversations, on the principle that no effort should be spared to test and exhaust every method of peaceful settlement.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, on November 26 I recommended to the President -- and he approved -- my calling in the Japanese representatives and handing them the broad basic proposals while withholding the modus vivendi plan. This was done in the late afternoon of that day.

The document handed the Japanese representatives on November 26 was divided into two parts:

The first part of the document handed the Japanese was marked "Oral." In it was reviewed briefly the objective sought in the exploratory conversations, namely, that of reaching if possible a settlement of questions relating to the entire Pacific area on the basis of the principles of peace, law and order and fair-dealing among nations. It was stated that it was believed that some progress had been made in reference to general principles. Note was taken of a recent statement by the Japanese Ambassador that the Japanese Government desired to continue the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement.

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In connection with the Japanese proposals of November 20 for a *modus vivendi*, it was stated that the American Government most earnestly desired to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. Our Government stated that in its opinion some features of the Japanese proposals of November 20 conflicted with the fundamental principles which formed a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each government had declared that it was committed.

Our Government suggested that further effort be made to resolve the divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned. Our Government stated that with this object in view it offered "for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations."

The second part of the document embodied the plan itself which was in two sections.

In Section I there was outlined a mutual declaration of policy containing affirmations that the national policies of the two countries were directed toward peace throughout the Pacific area, that the two countries had no territorial designs or aggressive intentions in that area, and that they would give support to certain fundamental principles of peace upon which their relations with each other and all other nations would be based. These principles were stated as follows:

"(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

"(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

"(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

"(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes."

This statement of policy and of principle closely followed the line of what had been presented to the Japanese on several previous occasions beginning in April.

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In Section I there was also a provision for mutual pledges to support and apply in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples liberal economic principles. These principles were enumerated. They were based upon the general principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

This suggested provision for mutual pledges with respect to economic relations closely followed the line of what had previously been presented to the Japanese.

In Section II there were outlined proposed steps to be taken by the two Governments. One unilateral commitment was suggested, an undertaking by Japan that she would withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indo China. Mutual commitments were suggested along the following lines:

(a) To endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the governments principally concerned in the Pacific area;

(b) To endeavor to conclude among the principally interested governments an agreement to respect the territorial integrity of Indo China and not to seek or accept preferential economic treatment therein;

(c) Not to support any government in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking;

(d) To relinquish extraterritorial and related rights in China and to endeavor to obtain the agreement of other governments now possessing such rights to give up those rights;

(e) To negotiate a trade agreement based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment;

(f) To remove freezing restrictions imposed by each country on the funds of the other;

(g) To agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate with Japan and the United States each furnishing half of the funds;

(h) To agree that no agreement which either had concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in a way to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement; and

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(i) To use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to the basic political and economic principles provided for in this suggested agreement.

The document handed the Japanese on November 26 was essentially a restatement of principles which have long been basic in this country's foreign policy. The practical application of these principles to the situation in the Far East, as embodied in the ten points contained in the document, was along lines which had been under discussion with the Japanese representatives in the course of the informal exploratory conversations during the months preceding delivery of the document in question. Our Government's proposal embodied mutually profitable policies of the kind we were prepared to offer to any friendly country and was coupled with the suggestion that the proposal be made the basis for further conversations.

A vital part of our program of standing firm for our principles was to offer other countries worthwhile plans which would be highly profitable to them as well as to ourselves. We stood firmly for these principles in the face of the Japanese demand that we abandon them. For this course there are no apologies.

Our Government's proposal was offered for the consideration of the Japanese Government as one practical example of a program to be worked out. It did not rule out other practical examples which either Government was free to offer.

We well knew that, in view of Japan's refusal throughout the conversations to abandon her policy of conquest and domination, there was scant likelihood of her acceptance of this plan. But it is the task of statesmanship to leave no possibility for peace unexplored, no matter how slight. It was in this spirit that the November 26 document was given to the Japanese Government.

When handing the document of November 26 to the Japanese representatives, I said that the proposed agreement would render possible practical measures of financial cooperation which, however, had not been referred to in the outline for fear that they might give rise to misunderstanding. I added also that I had earlier informed the Ambassador of my ambition of settling the immigration question but that the situation had so far prevented me from realizing that ambition.

It is not surprising that Japanese propaganda, especially after Japan had begun to suffer serious defeats, has tried to distort and give a false meaning to our memorandum of November 26 by referring to it as an "ultimatum". This was in line with a well-known Japanese characteristic of utilizing completely false and flimsy pretexts to delude their people and gain their support for militaristic depredations and aggrandizement.

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VII. THE LAST PHASE

After November 26 the Japanese representatives at their request saw the President and me on several occasions. Nothing new developed on the subject of a peaceful agreement.

On November 26 following delivery of our Government's proposal to the Japanese Ambassador, correspondents were informed by an official of the Department of State that the Japanese representatives had been handed a document for their consideration. This document, they were informed, was the culmination of conferences during the recent weeks and rested on certain basic principles with which the correspondents would be entirely familiar in the light of many repetitions.

On November 27 I had a special and lengthy press conference at which I told the correspondents they were free to use the information given them as their own or as having come from authoritative sources.

I said that from the beginning I had been keeping in mind, and I suggested that the correspondents keep in mind, that the groups in Japan led by the military leaders had a plan of conquest by force of about one-half of the earth with one-half of its population. They had a plan to impose on this one-half of the earth a military control of political affairs, economic affairs, social affairs, and moral affairs of each population very much as Hitler was doing in Europe.

I said that this movement in the Far East started in earnest in 1937. It carried with it a policy of non-observance of any standards of conduct in international relations or of any law or of any rule of justice or fair play.

From the beginning, we, as one of the leading free countries, had sought to keep alive the basic philosophy and principles governing the opposing viewpoint in international relations, that is, government by law, government by orderly processes, based on justice and morals and principles that would preserve absolutely the freedom of each country; principles of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries; the preservation inviolate of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries; the peaceful settlement of disputes; equality of commercial opportunities and relations. These and other principles that go along with them have been, I pointed out, the touchstone of all of our activities in the conduct of our foreign policy. We had striven to impress them on other countries, to keep them alive as the world was going more and more to a state of international anarchy. We had striven to preserve their integrity. That was no easy undertaking.

I said that in the spring of 1941 there had come up the question of conferences with the Japanese on the subject of peace. The purpose was

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to ascertain whether a peaceful settlement relating to the entire Pacific area was possible.

I mentioned that for a considerable time there had been two opposing groups in Japan. One was a military group, sometimes led by military extremists. They had seemed to be in the saddle when the China undertaking in 1937 was decided upon. As the Chinese undertaking went on, there was an opposing group in Japan, representing honest lovers of peace and law and order. Another portion of this group comprised those who personally favored the policy of force and conquest but considered that the time was not propitious, for different reasons, to undertake it. Some of this group were inclined to oppose Japan's policy because of the unsatisfactory experience of Japan in China and of what they regarded as Japan's unsatisfactory relations with Germany under the Tripartite Pact.

I said that our conferences with the Japanese during the preceding several months had been purely exploratory.

During that time I kept other countries who had interest in that area informed in a general way.

I pointed out that for the previous ten days or so we had explored all phases of the basic questions presented and of suggestions or ideas or methods of bringing Japan and the United States as close together as possible, on the theory that that might have been the beginning of some peaceful and cordial relations between Japan and other nations of the Pacific, including our own.

During the conversations, I said we had to keep in mind many angles. We had to keep in mind phases not only of the political situation but of the Army and the Navy situation. As an illustration, I cited the fact that we had known for some days from the facts and circumstances which revealed themselves steadily that the Japanese were pouring men and materials and boats and all other kinds of equipment into Indochina. One qualified observer reported the number of Japanese forces in Southern Indochina as 128,000. That may have been too high as yet. But a large military movement was taking place. There was a further report that the Japanese Navy might make attacks somewhere there around Siam, any time within a few days.

I told the correspondents that we were straining heaven and earth to work out understandings that might mitigate the situation before it got out of hand, in charge, as it was to a substantial degree, of Japanese military extremists.

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Referring to Indochina, I said that if the Japanese established themselves there in adequate numbers, which they seemed to be doing, they not only had a base for operations against China but they would be a distinct menace to the whole South Sea area. When we saw that this signified an extra danger, naturally we explored every kind of way to avoid that sort of menace and threat.

I said that we had had the benefit of every kind of view. Some charged us with appeasement, others with having let other countries down. All the time we had been working at just the opposite. All these various views were made in good faith and no fault attached to the proponents thereof. This was just a condition which was not without its benefits.

We had exhausted all of our efforts to work out phases of this matter with the Japanese. Our efforts had been put forth to facilitate the making of a general agreement. We wanted to facilitate the conversations and keep them from breaking down but at all times keeping thoroughly alive the basic principles that we had been proclaiming and practicing during all those years.

On November 26, I continued, I found there had been so much confusion and so many collateral matters brought in along with high Japanese officials in Tokyo proclaiming their old doctrines of force, that I thought it important to bring the situation to a clear perspective. So I had recounted and restated the fundamental principles and undertook to make application of them to a number of specific conditions such as would logically go into a broad basis peaceful settlement in the Pacific area.

There had been every kind of suggestion made as we had gone along in the conversations. I said that I had considered everything in the way of suggestions from the point of view whether it would facilitate, keep alive, and if possible carry forward conversations looking toward a general agreement, all the while naturally preserving the fullest integrity of every principle for which we stood. I had sought to examine everything possible but always to omit consideration of any proposal that would contemplate the stoppage of the conversations and search for a general agreement for peace.

To a correspondent's question whether I expected the Japanese to come back and talk further on the basis of what I gave them on November 26, I said that I did not know but, as I had indicated, the Japanese might not do that. I referred to the military movements which they were making and said I thought the correspondents would want to see whether the Japanese had any idea of renewing the conversations.

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In reply to a further question whether in order to conform to the basic principles of our Government's policy it would be necessary for the Japanese to withdraw the troops they were sending to the Southward, I said, "Yes". In reply to another question as to whether it would not mean withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and Indochina, I said that of course our program announced in 1937 covered all that. The question of getting the troops out of China had been a bone of contention.

In reply to a question whether the assumption was correct that there was not much hope that the Japanese would accept our principles and go far enough to afford a basis for continuing the conversations, I said that there was always a possibility but that I would not say how much probability there might be.

In reply to a question whether the Japanese had proved adamant on the question of withdrawing from the Axis, I replied that they were still in it.

In reply to a question whether the situation took action rather than words from the Japanese, I said this was unquestionably so, but it took words first to reach some kind of an understanding that would lead to action.

In reply to a question how the Japanese explained these military movements to the south, I replied that they did not explain.

On November 28, at a meeting of the War Council, I reviewed the November 26 proposal which we had made to the Japanese, and pointed out that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan. I emphasized that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. With due deference I expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination.

On November 29 I expressed substantially the same views to the British Ambassador.

I said the same things all during those days to many of my contacts.

On November 25 the American Consul at Hanoi, Indochina, had communicated to the Department a report that the Japanese intended to launch an

Br. Ex. _____
Ct. Ex. _____

(Vol. 7, pp. 1136-1165, Cont.)

attack on the Kra Peninsula about December 1, and he reported also further landings of troops and military equipment in Indo China in addition to landings he had previously reported from time to time. On November 26 the American Consul at Saigon had reported the arrival of heavy Japanese reinforcements in Southern Indo China, supplementing arrivals he had reported earlier that month. On November 29 the Department of State instructed its posts in southeast Asia to telegraph information of military or naval movements directly to Manila for the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet.

On November 30, I was informed by the British Ambassador that the British Government had important indications that Japan was about to attack Siam and that this attack would include a sea-borne expedition to seize strategic points in the Kra Isthmus.

In a message from Premier Tojo to a public rally on November 30 under the sponsorship of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the "Great Japan East Asia League" he stated among other things that:

"The fact that Chiang Kai-shok is dancing to the tune of Britain, America, and communism at the expense of able-bodied and promising young men in his futile resistance against Japan is only due to the desire of Britain and the United States to fish in the troubled waters of East Asia by pitting the East Asiatic peoples against each other and to grasp the hegemony of East Asia. This is a stock in trade of Britain and the United States.

"For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance."

On that day, Sunday, November 30, after conferring with our military regarding the Japanese Prime Minister's bellicose statement and the increasing gravity of the Far Eastern situation, I telephoned the President at Warm Springs and advised him to advance the date of his return to Washington. Accordingly, the President returned to Washington on December 1.

On December 2, the President directed that inquiry be made at once of the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu in regard to the reasons for continued Japanese troop movements into Indo China.

On December 3, I reviewed in press conference certain of the points covered by me on November 27. I said that we had not reached any more advanced state of determining questions either in a preliminary or other way than we had in November.

Br. Ex. _____
Ct. Ex. _____

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(Vol. 7, pp. 1136-1165, Cont.)

On December 5, the Japanese Ambassador called and presented a reply to the President's inquiry of December 2, containing the specious statement that Japanese reinforcements had been sent to Indochina as a precautionary measure against Chinese troops in bordering Chinese territory.

On December 6, our Government received from a number of sources reports of the movement of a Japanese fleet of 35 transports, 8 cruisers and 20 destroyers from Indochina toward the Kra Peninsula. This was confirmation that the long threatened Japanese movement of expansion by force to the south was under way. The critical character of this development, which placed the United States and its friends in common imminent danger, was very much in all our minds, and was an important subject of my conference with representatives of the Army and Navy on that and the following day.

On December 6, President Roosevelt telegraphed a personal appeal to the Emperor of Japan that the "tragic possibilities" in the situation be averted.

On December 7, the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor.

Throughout the critical years culminating in Pearl Harbor and especially during the last months, the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy and the heads of our armed services kept in constant touch with each other. There was the freest interchange of information and views. It was customary for us to pick up the telephone and for the caller to ask one of the others whether he had anything new of significance to communicate whatever the caller may have had that was new. These exchange of information and views were in addition to those which took place at Cabinet meetings and at meetings during the fall of 1941 of the War Council, and in numerous other conversations.

As illustrative of the contacts which I had with officers of the War and Navy Departments during the especially critical period from November 20 to December 7, 1941, I attach a record of the occasions when I talked with such representatives as compiled from the daily engagement books kept by my office (Annex A). That record may, of course, not be complete.

In addition, I attach a statement of the record of the occasions on which I talked with representatives of the War and Navy Departments from October 1940 to December 7, 1941 (Annex B.)

I attach also a statement in regard to the arrangements for contacts during the years 1940 and 1941 between the State Department and the War and Navy Departments (Annex C).

Br. Ex. _____
Ct. Ex. _____

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(Vol. 7, pp. 1136-1165, Cont.)

In the foregoing I have endeavored to give a simple narrative and analysis of what happened in this country's relations with Japan, especially as they bear upon the inquiry of this Joint Committee. If I can throw light on any aspect of our relations not covered in this statement, I shall be glad to do so.

.....

(Vol. 7, pp. 1189-1190)

Mr. Gesell: Well now, at about this time Secretary Stimson reports that there was a meeting at the White House, on the 25th of November, at which you and Secretary Knox and himself were present, and General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

He says there:

"The President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked, as soon as, perhaps, next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem."

Do you remember any conferences at that time or at about that time with the War Council as to what should be done about the general problem?

Mr. Hull: The main point I was making during these and subsequent days was the very great improbability that Japan would seriously continue to participate in any conversations. We had learned through the interceptions not only that they had determined on their ultimatum but that they had ordered that conversations cease on the 25th, and then finally they worried me almost sick after the 20th about getting a quick reply.

.....

(Vol. 9, p. 1472)

The Vice Chairman: Then you did regard the Japanese proposal of November 20 as nothing but an ultimatum?

Mr. Hull: Well, they said so both in writing and orally and we could only regard it as that from its very nature.

The Vice Chairman: Now, was your reply of November 26 in any sense an ultimatum?

Br. Ex. _____
Ct. Ex. _____

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Mr. Hull: Well, the truth is we were most anxious, as we have said here at different times, to go forward with the conversations, and we had every motive to desire to go forward with them, and we offered this, as I say, as an ordinary, normal plan for international relations, on these lines, and I think everybody in the State Department, the President and others, were in agreement; and, as I say, the Japanese would have found a way at once, all they had to do was to announce that they were through with conquest and aggression and automatically they would have become the beneficiaries of these proposals.

The Vice Chairman: Did you receive any information that the Japanese regarded your message of November 26 as an ultimatum?

Mr. Hull: Not until sometime afterward. They then had their fleet on its way, as I say, to Hawaiian waters. They themselves had ordered the discontinuance of conversations. We were satisfied, of course, that they would attack at any time. We didn't know what time. They had that solely within their own power. But it wasn't until they proceeded to manufacture a falsehood in order to dodge the effect of their own ultimatum, the old fraudulent cry, "Stop thief", they thought if they could pretend to their own people, they knew that that wouldn't travel far in this country, except at the hands of people who might be a little prejudiced or a little extreme in their views, but they felt that they could put over the idea in their own country just as Hitler put over one falsehood after another to shield and disguise his own plans and his own course to his armies of invasion.

The Japanese alibi was taken up and adopted by a few people in other parts of the world but not to any great extent.

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Doc 2007 (for the defense)

真珠湾攻撃調査三閣ニル兩院共同委員会ニ於テ
開催セラルル審議ニ於テ、前國務長官「小比類巻」
ノニタル證言中ヨリ、法廷ニ命ニテ報告スルニ要請サレ
提供サラルル被革。
同被革ハ、証事録第ニ卷及第ニ卷、國際檢察院
書類第ニ〇〇七號中ニ在ルモノナリ。

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

(牙文卷 第一〇八頁九至五九頁九)
一九三七年(昭和十二年)秋、我が政府ハ、中國及日本
間、交戦ニ對シ、中立法ニ適用スベキヤ否ヤ、決定ヲ下セ
羽目ニシタリ。中國ハ、武器、輸入必要トシ、日本ハ、
大量、軍需品ヲ製造シタリ以テ、中立法、正當ト認
ムル武器輸出禁止ハ、中國ニ損、日本ヲ利スルモノ
ナルコトハ明ニカデマス。大統領、法、之ニハ裁斷
自由ヲ用、同法、妥實施行セリ。

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一九三九年(昭和十四年)七月二十六日、我が政府ハ、日
本政府ニ對シ、一九二一年(明治四十四年)、通商航
海條約ヲ廢棄スル意向ニ言フ通告ヲシタリ。此、條約
ハ、日本ニ於テ又中國、日本ニ損害ニ於テモ、合衆
國、通商ニ對シテ命令ナル保護ヲ与ヘタルモノナリト感セリ。
又又同時ニ、同條約、皇取憲國條約、實施、日本、
通商ニ對スル報復手段採擇ニ對シテ障害トナルモノナリ。

Doc 2007 (For the Japanese)

アルト感でこころをアツク

然るに、同條のハ、一九四〇年(昭和十五年)一月二十六日失効となり、斯うして日本と貿易に我が方ニ於て加へる制限ニ對する法律上、障害ハ、除去せらるゝことナル。

一九三八年(昭和十三年)より、我が政府ハ、人道主義的考慮ヲ基礎トシテ採用シテ所謂「道義的移運輸」ヲ實施シ、一九四〇年(昭和十五年)七月二日、法律ヲ可決後、国防ノ爲、増加、一路ヲ他ノ軍需物資移運輸ニ對シ制限が加へらる。

此等ノ對策ハ、又日本、侵略的ノ行キ方ニ對シテ防上策トシテ、且又我々、反對表示トシテ意圖セられ、モ今アツキナル。

(才之卷 才一〇八九頁乃至才一〇九〇頁)

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此、期間中、合衆國ハ、中國ニ對シ、實行ニ得ル下ニ援助ト激勵、手ヲ益々、此方針ヲ以テ、此ハ、中國ニ對スル日本、侵略並ニ日本、帝國權益侵害ニ對スル抗議ニ於テ、外交的行動ヲ始メ、色々ト異ニ形式ヲ行ハシ、大約合計ニ億兩ニ至ル貸附トクキイフ上ガ、中國、經濟機構支那、中國、軍需品獲得ヲ容易クシタル意、提供セリ。而テ、後、貸付

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武器及その他、軍需品が、日本ニ對スル中國、抵抗ニ使用スル事、迷ラシム。

(牙文卷牙。九二頁)

此ノ年月、間中、我々ハ、日本政府、前ニ此等、主義原則ヲ求メ得ル限リ知アリク。且熱心ニ揭グテ来、且常ニ脅迫シタリ様ニ注意ラシメ来タリ。我々、私、若シ一國ノ政府が、脅迫ヲスレバ、同政府、何時でも直グ之ヲ支持スル覚悟ハナシラヌト。常ニ感心ト居タト、我々言フ。我々ハ、短月直入デアルが、然レ共事得ル限リ知アリク振舞フ。

以下次頁

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(第七卷第一一〇頁乃至第一一二頁)

太平洋全地域情勢、平和的ニミテ公平且安定の解決ヲ有スルニ必ズ限リ努力ヲシテ我々國分ヲ居ル。斯ル方策ニ本國民傳統的態度及信念ニ致シテ居ル。且又大統領ト外ト、美國トミテ侵略ニ抵抗スル他國々ニ緊要ナル防禦軍備増進ニ時間留ムコトが絶体必要ニシテ我々強調シ續ケル。我々最高軍部當局、警告、絶エ甚深ノ念頭ニ通シテイタズ。故ニ日本政府ト会谈ヲ開始セントス我々決意ハ自衛、尚、再武裝必要ニ合致シ居タリ。

大統領ト私ハ日本政府ハヨシ願フモ日本侵略政策ヲ突然ニ變更スルコト必ズイフヲ請フヲ解テ平カ。日本立場、建意ニシテ多クコトが關係ヲ居ル故、平和的政策ヲ採ル、約束ヲ日本身體的履行スルニ多大、時間ヲ要スト云クモ我々ハ解テ平カ。故ニ我々日本ヲ説キテ、侵略政策カウ輕シカニ極平極強ク努力ヲシテ寛情ニ居タリ。我々喧嘩腰デハカク然シ日本、ミテ全國家我々が適用シる根本原則ニ基礎的立場ヲ守ラント決意シ居タリ。

No 4

(第七卷第一二四頁乃至第一二五頁)

從一九四四年七月二十一日

doc 2007 (For the defense)

べし。大統領ハ、在米、支那及日本、資産、凍結
実施命令ヲ發シ。同命令支那又、日本、權益、
關係一切、經濟取引及輸出輸入貿易、取引ヲ
政府、管理下ニ置キ。此趣旨ハ、日本、貿易
易ヲ速力ニ事實上停止セラル。又、
八月六日、日本大使、印度支那、中立國ハ、大
統領提議ニ答ヘ、主、提議ヲ拒ミ。實
質的ニ、日本、右提議ハ、次、通シ。又、
一、日本政府、西南太平洋地域ニ軍隊ヲ駐セ
ルニ付、差控ヘ、支那事ヲ解決、後、傳
領印度支那ヨリ撤兵ス。又、中立性ヲ
保障シ、又東亞細亞ニ於テ合衆國ニ必須、資
源、生産及獲得ニ協力ス。ト約ス。又、
二、合衆國、西南太平洋地域ニ於テ其、軍ヲ
上、手段ヲ中止ス。同様、作為ヲ知爾及
英國兩政府ニ警告シ、西南太平洋ニ於テ日
本、必須、資源、生産及獲得ニ協力シ、日本
同、正常、通商回復、為善處ニ。日本及
重慶政府間、直接交渉招致ニ斡旋旁ヲトス。
且日本軍撤退後、雖モ印度支那ニ於テ日本
、特殊地位ヲ承認ス。ト約ス。

No 5

(五七卷中一一九頁乃至中一二〇頁)

No 6

Doc 2007 (For the Defense)

九月六日、逋衛總理大臣、東京駐在米國大使
ト、會談ニ於テ、本政府が日本ト、關係更新、
基礎トシテ、定ニ述ベクモ、原則ニ全幅決定的
贊成意ヲ示スモ、テ、此事ヲ表明シタ。然レ、一ヶ月後ニ、
日本外務大臣、米國大使ニ、是等四原則ハ、主權
トシテ、之ヲ受入ルモ、實效ニ同原則ヲ適用スル
當リ、或、修正が必要ナラント表明シタデアル。

(事七卷本一二三三頁)

十一月三日及ビ十一月七日、電報ニ於テ、日本駐在
米國大使、米國ト、戰爭ヲ不可避ナラシムル知リ
日本側、不意に打攻戰、可能性ニ東京ヲ敬告、
電報ヲ發シタ。

No 2007 (For the Defendant)

(第七卷第二三六頁乃至第二三五頁)

十二月二十日、日本、最後通牒及び我が回答

十二月二十日、日本大使及び末柄代、明カニ最終的
ナル提案ヲ私ニ渡シタ。私ハ政府、他、高宮達同
様陸海軍省ヨリ提供サレタ情報、日本通信
ヨリシテ、提案ハ日本、最後の提案即チ最後
通牒ナルコトヲ知ツタ、チアツタ。

同提案ハ以下、如ク書レキナル。

一 日本及び合衆國政府ハ其ニ日本軍が現在駐
屯セル佛領印度支那、一部ヲ除ク東南亞細
亞及び南太平洋地区、如何ナル地域ニ何等
武装進駐ヲ行ハザル旨、約定スルコト。

二 日本政府ハ日華間、平和回復、若シクハ太
平洋地区ニ於ケル公正ナル平和確立ト同時ニ、
佛領印度支那駐屯中、自己、軍隊ヲ撤退
セシムル事ヲ約スルモノトス。

三 日本政府ハ後日最終協定ニ於テ具体
ナルベキ目下、協定締結ト同時ニ、現在佛領
印度支那、南部ニ駐屯中、自己、軍隊ヲ同地
南部ニ移動セシムル用意ナルコトヲ宣言スル。

四 日本及び合衆國政府ハ兩國が南領東印
度ニ於テ必要トスル物資、入手ヲ確實トシ
タルタメ協力スルモノトス。

五 日本及び合衆國政府ハ兩國、通商關係

No 7

Doc 2007 (For the Defence)

No 8

ヲ資産凍結前、關係ニ復舊スルコトヲ相互ニ
約スルコト。

「合衆國政府ハ日本ニ要求量、油ヲ供給スルモトス。

「五合衆國政府ハ日華間、全面的平和恢復ヲ
計ル努力ニ當アルが如キ手段及ビ行動ヲ差控ヘル旨
約スルコト。」

斯ク提案サレシ該計畫ハ、合衆國ガ日本ニ要求
スル又、油ヲ日本ニ供給スル事凍結手段、中止合衆
國、中華民國ニ對スル援助、停止及ビ承認セラル
民國政府ニ對スル道義的乃至物質的支援、打切
リヲ要求シクモテアル。夫ハ日本ガ其ノ軍隊ヲ南部印
度支那ヨリ北部印度支那ニ移駐セシムル一項ハ設テ
アルモ日本ガ印度支那ニ派遣スベキ軍隊、數量ニ就テ
如何ナル制限モ置カス又、日華間、平和恢復若シクハ太
平洋地区ニ於ケル公正ノ平和確立後ニ至ル迄、其等ノ軍
隊撤退ニ對スル何等ノ規定モテキカッタ、デアル。

東南亞細亞並ニ南部太平洋(印度支那ヲ除ク)ハ、日本、
武裝兵力、以上、増大ニ對スル約定ハ、ソレガ印度支那、
北方ニ在ル亞細亞、如何ナル地方トイヘドモ例ヘバ中國、ソビエ
ト聯邦、如キニ於テ无前カラ、又、新クハ日本、侵略行動ヲ防
止スル何等ノ規定モ存在シテカッタ、デアル。該提案ハ日本ヲ幸
侵略ヲ放棄シ平和的方策ニ復歸スルヲ誓ハシムル何等ノ規定
ヲモ含ニテカッタ、デアル。

十月三日、春田氏ハ、星野氏ヲ訪シ、三國條約下、日本ニ義務關スル法、
草案ヲ私ニ渡シ、ソノ不惑何等請フモ、又、役ニ立ツモノヲ提供シ
ナカシ。私ハ、春田氏ニ全體トシテ平和的解決ノ主題ニ就テ更ニ何カ

Doc 2007 (For the Defense)

提議スルコトアルカト云々、未編成ハナリト答ヘタ。

十月二十日、我々ハ日本軍ガ日本委任統治諸島、
 内、蘭領印度心臓部ニ最モ近い地點、パラオニ附
 近ニ到着シタト言フ情報ヲ得タト言フ報告ヲ知
 蘭カラ受ケタ。我々ハ、河内、及び、西貢、駐在領
 事ハ、日本軍及び軍需ノ大規模ナル印度支那
 新上陸ヲ報ジテキタ。吾々ハ、日本ノ傍受通信ヲ通
 ジテ、日本政府ハ、交渉ハ十月二十五日ヲ以テ、之ハ後十一月
 十九日ニ延長セリタガ、打切ルベキコトニ決セリト言フ情報ヲ
 得タ。我々ハ又他ノ日本傍受通信カラシテ、日本ハ如何ナル讓歩
 モデス意思ナキコトヲ知リタ。此ノ事實ハ十月二十日ノ日本政府ハ
 コレ以上何等提議スベキコトナシト言フ事ヲ明カニシタ私ニ
 對スル來函ノ陳述トテ考ヘ合セテ見ルニ、既ニ述べタ通り
 十月二十日ノ日本ノ提議ハ、事實上彼等ノ「絶對的最
 後提議」デアリタ事ハ明カデアリタ。提議セラルタ全條
 等點ハ、日本ガ其ノ公言セル征服行動ヲ讓ルカ、或ハ我々
 ガ太平洋及び全世界ニ於テ主張スル基本原則ヲ讓ル
 カデアリタ。一九四一年(昭和十六年)盛夏迄ハ、我々ハ日本ガ其
 ノ武力ニ対シテ擴張ヲ針ヲ繼續スルニ決シタ事ニ十分満足
 シテキタ。我々ハ彼等ガ我々ガ我々ノ原則ヲ固守シテキタ事
 ヲ明ニシテ置イタメテタ。併シ、彼等ハ其ノ武力ヲ脅迫
 ニヨリ我々が威壓セラレ讓歩スルカモ知レヌトイフ機會
 ヲ賭ケテ行動シテ居タコトハ明カデアリタ。彼等ハ充分武
 裝シテ居タソシテ我々ハ、彼等ガ時ヲ擇ハズソノ望ムトコロ
 ニ從ツテ攻撃スルカヤラウト言フコトヲ知ツテキタ。若シ圖ラズ

NO 9

Doc 2007 (Forth Defense)

モ我々が其基本原則ヲ讓歩シタラバ、日本ハ、多分暫時ノ間、少ク
トモ戰ハズシテ得ラレル利益ヲ享受國ニスルノ時迄ハ、攻撃シテカントコ
トチアラウ。我が國ガ日本ニ戰フ強制シクトイフ問題ハ全然ナカツ
タノデアル。問題ハ我が國ガ其ノ原則ヲ犧牲ニスル用意ガ
アルカドウカデアツタ。十月二十日ノ日本ノ提案ヲ受諾スルトイフ
事ハドウシテモ考ヘラレナイ事デアツタ。夫ハ合衆國ヲシテ日
本ノ征服及ビ侵略計畫ニ於ケル其ノ與國ヲラシメ、且
ヒソトラートノ合作ノ與國トシテシマツタデアラウ。夫ハ合衆
國ニ其ノ主義政策ヲ放棄セヨト言フ日本ノ要求ニ屈服シタ事ト
シタコトデアラウ。夫ハ威嚇下ニ我々地位ヲ棄テテ淺クモ降服シ
タ事トモシタデアラウ。情勢ハ危期ニ瀕シ事實上絶望的ナモノ
デアツタ。然シ面ニ於テ我が政府ハ平和的解決方法ヲ發見シ余カヲ傾
注シフケモ當國軍部長官ガ對抗準備ニ何時ヨリ要スル迄強調シ
續ケテチテ除テモアリ武力衝突ハ之ヲ避ケ或ハ延引シ度ト希望シテチ
タ。チタノ處ガ他ガ日本ハ予ヲ見セト要求シテチテチタ。事能
ハ此様デアツト即チ日本ハ其ノ要求ヲ讓ラズ威嚇シテ居リ我が國ハ其
主張ヲ固守シテ居リタリ。外交ニ依リテ此ノ危期ヲ處スル機會ハ事實
上チケツタ居リ。我々ハ要求ヲ擯ミカルト言フ所ヲ達シテチテチン送
ル道ハニツタ。我が政府ハ解答ヲセスト言フ事ヲ出来タデアラウ。期ヲスレバ日
本軍部ハ巨頭等ハ米國政府ハ解答ヲセヌミナラズ他ノ採ルベキ政策
ヲ提出シヨウトシタイト國民ニ告グル事ヲ出来タデアラウ。我が政府ハ日本
ノ要求ヲモシテ拒絶スルト言フ事ヲ出来タデアラウ。ソウナル
ト日本軍部ハ巨頭等ハ全然虛構ヲハアルニシテモ兵ヲ用
ヒテ攻撃スル口實ヲ與ヘラレル事ニナル。

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我が政府、尤モ之ヲ對提案提出ニ努メスルト云フ事モ
出来ヨウ。最後ノ道ガ我々ノ選ニタモイデアツタ。
及對提案ノ内容勸考ニ際シハ其ノ中ニ成ル可能ナル暫
定協定ノ件ヲ含ム痛考慮セラル、デアツタ。斯カル提案
ハ我々國ガ何處ニテモ平和ニ関シテ有ニテ平ルト云フ事
ヲ示ス利益トモナラウ。又日本人ガ此提案ヲ受理シテ
イ場合ニハ幾合カ彼等ヲ各自ニ甘ニ又利益トモナラウ。
右ノ之ガ交渉延引ノ役ニ立ツタナラハ陸軍ニモ海軍ニ
モ準備スル時ヲ與ヘタ事ト思フ。此ノ暫定協定案ハ
大統領及ヒ陸海軍ノ目懸ニ達シヨリ國務省內ニ於テ
十一月二十二日ヨリ十一月二十六日迄論議セシ又熟慮セラル
デアツタ。最初ノ草案ハ十一月二十二日ニ出来、修正案ハ十一
月二十四・二十五日ニ完成ス。此ハ又英國、豪洲、和蘭、中華
民國等ノ政府トモ論議セラル、デアル。案出セラル暫定
協定ハ合衆國及ヒ日本、其ノ國家ヲ恆久平和ノ方向ニ向ケルニ云
フ相互公約、太平洋地區ニ於テ武力進駐或ハ脅威ニ對シ
テ相互保障、南部印度支那ヨリノ日本兵力ノ撤退、日米間、
一定額目ノ貿易ノ或特定ノ限度內ニテ再始ヲ認ムル事
經令並ニ輸入制限ヲ英國側ニテ修正スル事、右ニ對應ス
ル凍結令並ニ輸入制限ノ日本側ニ於ケル修正及ヒ右方
策ト同種ノ方策ヲ豪洲、英國、和蘭ニ於テモ取ラセル
目的ヲ以テ各政府ニ交渉シテ事ヲ規定シテ中ラ。尚又日華兩
政府間、如何ニ此項極大ニ平和法律秩序、正義、原則ニ基ク
キモノトシテ、合衆國ノ重要關心事ヲ示シテモ無シヨウ。

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・同暫定協定の三ヶ月間效力を有し更に延長せし得べきモノナリト言フ規定カアリ。

同時ニ此ノ暫定協定、非常ニ重要ナル一部トシテ日本人ニ公明正大ナル線ニ沿ヒ太平洋地區ノ解決ヲ得ル解決ヲ案出スル基礎トモナリ得ル平和解決ノ大綱ヲ考慮ノ爲メ與ヘル事ヲ提案シタリ。十一月十一日極東事務局ニ於テ公明ナル線ニ沿ツテ提案ノ草稿カ或ハ参考トナルベキ事ガアルトテ準備サレタリテアリタリ。此ノ草案ハ他ノモノト同様、交渉ヲ續行シ（カクテ時ヲ得）モ受諾セシメ米國ノ主義ニ適合スル性質ノ解決ヲ得ル解決ニ最後ニ達スル様ニトノ目的ヲ以テ作成セラルタリ。

此ノ草稿提案ハ我が四月十六日日本政府ニ提出シタリ原則ヲ始メ一般原則、聲明ト經濟政策ニ関スル原則ノ聲明トヲ含ミタリ。此ノ草稿ニヨリ合衆國ハ中國及ヒ日本國政府ニ對シ平和交渉開始ヲ提案シ、交渉期間中ハ日本政府ハ中國政府ニ休戦ヲ提議スベキモノトシタリ。此ノ休戦案ハ日本ニ不公平ナリ利益ヲ齎ラズモノト考ヘテ之ヲ排除セシタリ。

余ガ注意ヲ拂ツタ他ノ提案ハ、前日財務省ヨリ受ケ取ツタ全面的解決提案ノ草稿ニ基キ十一月十九日當省ニ於テ暫定的ノ形ニ作成セタリ修正案アリタリ。此ノ暫定的提案ハ陸海軍兩者ト審議セラル。ソノ結果出来タ修正案ニ於テ彼等ガ異議ヲ説

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ヘタ點ハ削除サレタ。

私カ考慮ミテ牛タ第三ノ提案ハ暫定協定アリ
ツタ。

十一月二十日カラ同二十六日頃マデノ間ニ私カ日本
側ニ提出シヨウト思ツテ牛タモノハ我々ノ暫定
協定ト公明正大ナル線ニ沿ツテ太平洋地區
ニ於ケル全面的解決ヲ案出スル基礎トモナ
リ得ベキ平和解決案大綱トアリツタ。

此ノ二番目ノソコニ一層廣汎ナ部分ハ十一月十一日案
及ビ十一月十九日案ニ示セタ所ニ從ツタトコロモア
ツタ。

暫定協定カ尙考慮中アリツタ時私ハ十一月二十
五日ノ戦争會議ノ席上デ我カ國ト日本ノ國交
關係ノ危機ヲ強調シタ。

大統領、國務、陸軍、海軍各長官、參
謀總長、海軍作戰部長、ヨリ成ル戰
争會議ハ我々カ夫々ノ交際ニ於テ、夫
々ノ社會ニ於テ一般ニ論ジ合ワレ牛タ全
クノ情報ヤ意見ノ交換所ノ様ナモノ
アリツタ。

此等會議アリハ特別ナ場合ノ事件
ノ進展ノ特ニ興味アル事ハ必ス論評
サレタ。

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ソノ会議ノ席上私ハ日本軍部ハ既ニ攻撃能ハシキヲ取
ツテモトモ自分ノ豫想ヲ表明シタ。日本ノ指導者達
ハ決シテ死テアツタデアル。彼等ハイツ何時何処ニモ
突出スルカモ知ラズソニチ私ハ彼等ノ計畫ノ不意ヲ突キ
ソノト點ヲ強調シタ。余ハ實際ニ最後ノ段階ニ至ツタ事
ヲ感ズ。ソニチ我が國ノ安全ヲ防衛スルに務メ陸海軍
ノ掌中ニテ思フ。

十二月二十四日廣省ヲ通シ「ヤ・ヤ・ヤ」氏ニ打電サシタ。通告
ニ於テ「ヤ・ヤ・ヤ」氏ハ大統領ノ我々ノ提案ニ對シ暫定協定
説明ニ附シテ「余ハ余ヲ希望スモツテ居タ。我々ハ此項
ハ速カニ至ル本當ノ困難ニ備ヘテ置キ」ト云フ
言葉ヲ加ヘタ。

十二月二十五日二十六日、夜私ハモウ一度我々ノ提案案ヲ暫
定協定ノ件ニ就テ考慮シタ。

余ハ既ニ指摘セル如ク十二月二十二日、二十四日、二十五日、連續セ
ル草稿（第一）事ヲ含ミ「ヤ・ヤ・ヤ」氏ハ暫定
協定後（二）原則ノ聲明ト此ノ適用法ヲ示ス例ヲ提案
シタモ「ヤ・ヤ・ヤ」氏ハ其後（三）條ノ提案ト呼ビ「ヤ・ヤ・ヤ」
モ「ヤ・ヤ・ヤ」。

余並ニ我々が政府、他ノ高官達（日本軍部が攻撃
能ハシキト云フ事ヲ知ツテ居タ。我々ハ日本政府ハ
期限付キヲ始メ十二月二十五日後ニ十二月二十九日ニ延長シ
タガ—我が政府ハ彼等ノ十二月二十日ノ極端ナル最後的
提案ヲ受諾スル事ヲ要求シタ事ヲ知ツテ居タ。

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我々ハ日本ニモウ一度、我々が總テ、國家ニ提言シタモ
、即チ平和的、互惠的且進歩的ノ線ニ沿ッテ、協
カスルト云コトヲ提議シタ筋書ヲ提言スルコトガ本末
タデアル。日本ハ何時デモ、此ノ種ノ筋書ヲ受入レテ
其ノ方向ニ動クコトガ出来タリテ、ソウスルコトハ、
日本ニトッテ本ダニ可能ナリテ、ソレハ日本ガ決メルベキ
事柄デアリタ、日本ガソウ決メルベキ願ッタ我々ノ希望
ハ、事實上破ラレタ、ケレトモ、平和的解決ノ凡ル手
段ヲ試ミ且盡ス爲メ、如何ナル努力モ惜ミテハナラ
ナイ、ト云フ原則ノ上ニ、我々ノ將來ノ会谈ニ於テ、大
キテ然リシ單純ノ解決ノ一ツノ標本ヲ作り出スト云
フ形ニ於テ、此ノ非常ニ基礎的ノ努力ヲ進メテ行
フコトガ望マシイト考ヘラレタ。

上述ノ様ナ考エテ十一月二十六日ニ、私ハ大統領
ニ、私ガ日本ノ代表者達ヲ招致シテ、暫定的
計畫ハ見合セ置キ、此ノ大綱的基礎的ノ提
議ヲ手交スルコトヲ進言シ、大統領ハ之ニ同意
シタ。此ノコトハ其ノ日ノ午後晚ク行ハレタ。

十一月二十六日ニ、日本ノ代表者達ニ手交サレ
タ文書ハ、ニツノ部分ニ分レテナリ。

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Dec 2007 (Forthcoming)

日本側ニ手交サレタ大書ノ最初、部分ニハ「
題ト云フ記号ガ附サレタ。其ノ中ニハ豫
備會議デ探求サレタ目標、即チ、若シモ
太平洋全域ニ関係アル問題ヲ、國家間
ニ平和、法律、秩序及ビ公正ナ處理ノ原則ニ
立脚シテ解決ニ導キ付ケル」云フ目標ガ簡單
ニ再述サレタ中タ。原則ニ関シテ、若干ノ進捗
ヲ示ミタト信セラレハ旨ガ述ベラレタアツタ。日本政
府ハ全般ノ平和解決ヲ目的トシ、會議、
繼續ヲ希望スル旨、日本大使、最近ノ言明ニモ
言及サレタ中タ。

十一月二十日、暫定協定ニ関スル日本、提案ニ就
キ、米國政府ハ全太平洋領域ニ亘ル廣範
圍ノ平和寧作成立ヲ望ミ、日本政府ト、會議
ノ繼續ニハ凡ル機會ヲ享スルコトヲ希望スル
旨ガ述ベラレタアツタ。十一月二十日、日本側提案
ノ若干、特長ハ我カ國政府ノ見解ニ依リ、目下
考慮中ノ一般ノ取極ヲ一部ヲ形成スル根本原則
ニ抵触スルト我カ政府ハ述ベタアツタ。各國政
府ハ其ノ原則ニ關係ガ凡ト一言ニテ平ルナシ。

我カ政府ハ既述ベラレタ基本原則、實際的
適用ニ関スル意見、相違ヲ解決スル爲、尚努力
スベキタト提言シタ。此ノ目的ヲ念頭ニ於テ

No 17

Doc 2007 For the Asians;

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我々、將來、會議中ニ解決 せしむべきモノト我々
政府が觀察を案、之、事實上ノ例トシテ、金太平洋
三國、大綱的ニ之、之、間單ニ解決せしむ日本、政府
、考慮ニ供ニシテ我々政府ニ通シタリ。

文書、之、二部、二章ニ分シテ居ル。計畫案、其、物ヲ
具體化ニシタリ。

第一章ニ於テハ、同國家、國家、金太平洋地域
ニ見テ平和ニ向テシタルコト、兩國、其、地域ニ於テ
何等、領土の要國ニ示侵略の野望ニ有テ
、及ビ兩國、相互、關係、及ビ他、諸國家、
關係、基礎ヲ置テ平和、或ハ根本原則ヲ支持
スルコトヲ肯定スル政策、相互宣言ガ概
述サレタリ。是等、原則ハ、次、様ニ述ベラル

- (一) 總テ、國家、領土保安、及ビ主權、不可侵原則。
- (二) 他國家、內政問題ニ不干渉、原則。
- (三) 通商上、機會均等及ビ待遇、平等ヲ含
平等、原則。

(四) 紛争、防止、並ニ平和的解決及ビ國際状況ヲ
平和的、手段、方法ニ依リ、改善スルモノニ國際間
、協力及ビ有和ニ依ル原則。

此、政策及ビ原則、聲明ハ、四月以來、數回ニ亘
ツ日本、政府ニ提出サレタリ、聲明、線ニ即チ平タリ。

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第一章ニ又彼等相互同乃至他國及び他民族トノ經濟關係ニ於テ、自由經濟原則ヲ支持シ、適用スルト云フ相互誓約ノ規定モアツタ。是等諸原則ハ列國等セラレテキル。而シテ之等ハ通商機會及び待遇ノ平等ノ一般的原則ニ基クモノデアツタ。此ノ經濟關係ニ関スル相互誓約ノ提案サレタル規定ハ以前ニ日本側ニ提出サレタソレノ線ニ即シテキタ。第二章ニハ兩國政府ノ採ルベキ提案方策が概述サレタアツタ。日本が全陸海空軍乃至警察力ヲ中國及び印度支那ヨリ撤退スルト云フ日本側ノ保障タルソノ片務公約ガ暗示セラレテ居リ相互公約トシアハ次ノ諸線ニ即シテイタモノが暗示セラレテキタ。

第一トシテ太平洋地域ニ關係アル諸政府間ニ於テ相互的不可侵條約ノ締結ニ努ムベキコト

第二トシテ諸政府間ニ於テ印度支那ノ領土保全ヲ尊重シ而シテ該地ニ於ケル特惠經濟待遇ヲ求メ或ハ受ケザル協約ヲ締結スルニ努ムコト。

第三トシテ重慶ニ臨時首都ヲ有スル中華民國國民政府以外ノ在華政權ヲ支持セザルコト。

第四トシテ中國ニ在ル治外法權乃至ソレニ類スル權利ヲ撤廢シ斯カル權利ヲ現有スル他ノ諸政府ノ之等權利ヲ放棄ニ付スル同意ヲ得ルニ努ムコト。

第五トシテ相互的最惠國待遇ニ基ク通商條約ヲ商議スルコト。

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No. 20

い各々、國ニ依リ相互ノ資産ニ課セラルル凍結制限ヲ撤却スルコト
(1) 日本及び合衆國が各々資金ノ半分ヲ供給スル事門相場ノ安定計畫ニ同意スルコト
(2) 当事國ノ何レカが第三國、一國又ハ數國ト既ニ締結セル條約ハ何レモ此ノ條約ノ基本目的ト接觸スルモノト当事國ハ解釋セザルニ同意スルコト
而シテ
川提案サレタ本協定中ニ規定セル基本的政府經濟原則ヲ他ノ政府ヲテ固守セシムル様 当事國勢力ヲ利用スルコト
十二月ニ至リ日本側ニキ渡サレタル文書ハ本質的ニハ長イ間我が國ノ對外政策ノ根本ヲ成シテキル諸原則ノ再述デアッタ。
本文書ノ含ムテ條ニ依リ具體化サレテキル如ク極東ノ情勢ヲ對スル是等ノ原則ノ實際的適用ハ上述ノ文書ガキ交サレ以前、數ヶ月間ニ行ツタ略式豫備會談中ニ日本側代表者ト爲ミタ論議ノ線ニ沿ツタモノデアッタ。
我が政府ノ提案ハ如何ナル友好國家ニモ提出セントスル様ニ相互ニ有利ナ政策ヲ具體化スルモノデアリ同提案ガ爾後ノ會談ノ基礎トナルベシト云フ提議ト結び付ケラレタモノデアッタ
我が方ノ諸原則ヲ斷乎トシテ擁護スルト云フ我

No. 21

Doc. 2007 (For the Defense)

々ノ計畫ノ最モ肝要ナ事ハ他ノ諸國家ニ對シテモ
我々自身ニ對スルト同様ニ非常ニ有利ナ立派ナ
計畫ヲ提言スル事デアル我々ハ日本側ガ是等ノ諸
原則ヲ放棄スル様主張シタモ拘ラズ斷ヤトシテ
是ヲ擁護シタノデアル此後行ニ對シ何等陳辭
スル所ヘイ。我ガ政府ノ提案ハ作成セラレルベキ計
畫ノ一ツノ事實上ノ例トシテ日本政府ガ考慮スル
爲候ガレタモノデアル夫レハ何レノ政府ニ依ッテモ
自由ニ提出サレル他ノ事實上ノ例ヲ排除スルモノデ
ハナカツタノデアル
今談ヲ通ジテ日本側ガ征服支配政策ヲ棄スル
事ヲ拒否セルニ鑑ミ我々ハ日本ガ不計畫ヲ受諾
スル見込ハ極メテ薄イト云フ事ハ良ク承知シテ平ク
ノデアル併シテ和ノ可能性ハソレガ如何ナル微小ナ
ルモノニモセヨ探索シ盡サズニ六措カイト云フノガ政
治家ノ任務デアル此ノ精神ヲ以テ十月三十一日ノ文
書ガ日本政府ニ手渡サレタノデアル

Doc 2007 (For the Defense)

十一月二十六日、文書日、日本代表ニ手文サレ際、私ハ提案セル
協定ハソノ要綱中ニ誤解ヲ惹起スル点カアルデニ及ビテ
ナク、財政的協力ニ関スル實際的方策ヲ提供スルカヲ知
ナト述ベタル。私ハ更ニ加ヘテ、同ニ私ハ移民問題解決ニ
関スル私ノ希望ヲ大體ニ通告シタカ、今日迄情勢ハ私ヲシテソ
ノ希望實現ノ運ビニ至ラズナリト自述ヘタ。

日本側宣傳ハ特ニ日本ノ惨敗ヲ喫シ始メタカラハ我カ方ノ十一
月二十六日、覺書ヲ最後通牒ト稱シテ、夫ヲ曲解シ之ニ
虚偽ノ意味ヲ付ヘト努メタコト驚キニ付ハタリ。此ノ事ハ日本
國民ヲ欺キ軍國主義的掠奪ト膨脹ト對シ、彼等
支持ヲ得ルタニ虚偽淺薄ノ口實ヲ完全ニ利用スル
云フ周知ノ日本人ノ特性ト一致スルモノナリ。

七 最近ノ局面

十一月二十六日以後、日本側代表ハ彼等申出ニ依リ、大統領
及私ト数回會見シテ平和的協約ニ関シテ何等新展
開ヲ見サレタ。

十一月二十六日、日本大使ニ對シ我カ政府提案ノ傳達ニ次イテ
記者團ハ日本代表達カ文書ヲ検討、為キ文サレ且、國
務省ニ片更ニ依リ報知サレタ。此文書ハ彼等カ報知サレタ
ト依リハ、最近數日間ニ亘ル會談ノ極點ニ至リテ再ニ反復ニ
照シ、記者達カ全ク熟知シタル如キ或根本原則ニ其ラステ
アリタ。十一月二十七日、私ハ長時間、新聞記者團ト特別會見ヲ
行ヒ、ソノ席上、私ハ記者團ニ、彼等五ハシテ情報ヲ彼等自
身ニテトミ、或ハ權威筋ヨリ得タルトテ、彼等カ利用スルニハ自
由アリト告ケタ。

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私軍相導者事日本同志者達が世界人に事分有
地球、約事分武力依て征服之計画ヲ持て中にも、最初
之念頭要道トナト語。又記者團カ之ヲ念頭要道トナ
私提言多彼等、此地球一事トナト一が歐洲行テ
多ト酷似之各民族、政治、經濟、社會及道德事情、
軍事支配ヲ強制之計画ヲ持て中にも、私、極東に於
此、初九三五年昭和十二年三本式ニ開始サト語。天國
際關係に於て行為凡二標準或ハ法律或ハ正義法則或
公正、不尊重政策ヲ伸ぶ最初。我々、主要自由國家
トナト國際關係に於て對主之見解ヲ支配之基礎原理及
原則ヲ存續スルニ希キ。即チ此ニ統治各國自由見
全保障ス正義道德及主義甚多一定、規律ヲ據
以方法依統治他國內事對主不干涉主義他國主權及
領土保全不侵犯、保持、紛争、平和的解決、通商機會
及關係、平等云々。此等及之トナト其、他、主義、
我々外交政策行為凡二標準、標準下ト私指摘。
我々世界が益國際的無政府狀態ニ向テ、ナト等、主
義ヲ存続サシタ他、諸國ニ、等、鐵記カニ捕カシテ来
我々、保全ヲ保障スル無カシ来、ナト。而テ、決
容易トナトナ。

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初九四年(昭和十二年)春平和問題ヲ日本側ト、會談問題
起、事ト述、其目的、全太平洋地域ニ関ス平和的解
決可能。否ヲ確スナト。
永々間日本ニ、相立ニ國体カ下ト私述。

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ソノハ軍閥デ之ハ時ニ軍人極端論者ニ指導サレタ。彼等ハ
五三七年昭和十三年ノ支那事變ガ決定サレタ時ニ權力ヲ握ツテ居ル
様デアル。支那事變ノ進行ニシテ、日本ハ平和法律、及び
秩序ヲ衷心カラ愛好スル者ヲ代表トスル一ツノ反對團體ガアル。
此ノ團體一部ハ個人的ニ武力及び征服ノ政策ヲ支持シナガラ
リニ着目スルトハ色々ナ理由デ時ヲ得テ居ナリト居ヘタ人々ヲ
包含シテ居タ。此ノ團體ニ属スル或ル人々ハ支那ニ於ケル日本ノ不満
足ナル経験、及び彼等見ル所ノ三國協定下ニ於ケル日獨間ノ不満足
ナル外交關係ニ鑑ミ、日本ノ政策ニ反對スル傾向ヲアル。私ハソレ以前ノ
數ヶ月間ニ於ケル我々ト日本トノ會議ハ全ク瀟灑的ニ進ムツト言フ。
其ノ期間中、余ハ其地域ニ於テ利害關係ヲ有ス他ノ諸國ニ絶
ズ一般的ニ情報ヲ傳ヘテ置タ。

余ハソレ以前ノ約十日間ニ我々ニ提出サレタ根本問題、及び日本ト美國
ヲ含メテノ各單、他ノ諸國トノ間ノ何等カノ平和的親善的關係
ノ端緒トモナルデアラウトト見解トシ、日本ヲ出来ルカ親密ニスルタメ
ニ提言意見或ハ方法ニ就イテ凡ソ局面ヲ探求シタニテ指摘シタ。
私ハ會議中、我々幾多ノ困難カヲ察シテハナリト言フ。
我々ハ政治的關係ノミナラス陸海軍關係ニ関スル局面モ考慮ニ
入レナレバナラナク、其ノ例トシテ引継キ明日トナツテ来タ事實ヤ
事情カラシテ、日本軍ハ人員、資材、船舶、及び凡ソ種々ノ施設ヲ
印支支那ニ注入シテ居タ事ヲ、我々ハ數日來カラ知ツテ居タ事ヲ引照シタ。
事情通一ノ觀察者ハ南佛印ニ於ケル日本軍ノ數ヲ、十三万八千
ト報告シタルハ多過ぎタモ知ナシ。然レ軍隊ノ大移動ハ行
ハレテ居タ。更ニ數日中ニミヤル局、通、或地島ヲ討シ日本海軍ガ

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攻撃を加へるに知すといふ報告が立つ。余は情勢が實際に多分
日本軍人、極端論者多きを慮り、今更へて三つ又三つ事
態を緩和する機に諒解を得て、爲我の懸念、努力を三つ
居るに於て記者團に語らう。
第一、印支支那と言及して、若し日本軍が現に爲すといふに
は、如く十分兵力を以て同地駐屯せしむ。彼等は、中華作戦基
地を持つに力するが、洋金地域を封鎖し、明瞭な脅威を以て上述べ
る。是は特別、危険な意味を有する。我々には、我々の勿論
此の種に脅威を避ける爲、凡そ方法の研究をせしむ。
我々の凡そ種に脅威を解し、意思を安んずる。或る人に
我々、宥和主義を主張し、又或る人に他諸國に見捨てられざるを
求む。我々の絶えず正反對の努力を以てせしむ。是は種々、
見解の相違を善意を以てせしむ。提言者達、何等
提言者側、非をもちしむ。之に全き利益、無きといふは、然る
に、
我々の日本側、此問題、諸同面を解し、爲我の努力を傾倒す。
我々の努力、一般の協定、作成を希望する。之を爲す。我々の
我々の、金策、空會同、金策を中断せしむ。之を爲す。
然るに、從來多き事、百り、若し實行、之を以て、基本的
原則、常に完全に生かす事、
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私ハ更ニ續キテ言フ。十一月二十六日東京ニ於ケル日本政
府高官達、古キ武力主義、宣言ト共ニ多大ノ混乱ト多ク、
附隨事項ヲ導入セシメ来タ、テ私ハ情勢ニハッキリシテ見
透ラ附ケルコトガ重要ナルト考ヘタ。ソコテ私ハ基本的原則
ヲ再檢討再述シ且是等ノ原則ヲ太平洋地域ニ於ケル廣
汎ニ基礎的平和的解決ニ論理的ニ含ミレルベキ多數
ノ特殊條件ニ適用シヨウト企テタ。

我々ガ右會談ヲ繼續スル間ニ凡ル種類ノ提言ガアリタ。
私ハ勿論我々ノ主張スル總ベテノ主義、完全ナル保持ヲ期
シ、一般的協定ヲ期待スル會談ヲ容易ニシテ存續セシム且
右ニホスルヲ促進スルモノナルカドウカ、觀點カラ總テ提
言ヲ考慮シテ述ベタ。私ハ總ベテノ可能ナルモノヲ檢討シヤ
ト努メタ、テアルカ、然レ會談及ビ平和ニ関スル一般的協定
ヲ求メントスル努力ノ停止ヲ企図スルカ如キ提案ノ考慮ヲ
常ニ省クヤウニ努メタ。

私ハ十一月二十六日ニ日本側ニ與ヘタ基礎ニ彼等ガ再ニ歸
ツテ更ニ會談スルコトヲ私ガ期待スルカドウカト、一記者
ノ質問ニ對シ私ハ知ラナイカ私ガ既ニ述ベタ様ニ日本側
ハソウシナイカモシナイト述ベタ。私ハ彼等ガ行ツテ居
ル軍事行動ニ言及シテ、記者達ハ日本側ガ右會談ヲ
再開スル考ヘアルカドウカヲ知り度イタラウト考ヘルト
述ベタ。

我が政府、政策、根本的原則ニ一致セシメルガ爲ニ日本
ハ南方ニ派遣シタル軍隊ヲ撤退セシメル必要ガアル

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カドツリト、次、質問ニ答テ、私、同然リト云ツタ。更ニソ
レハ日本軍隊、中国及ビ印度支那カラノ撤兵ヲ意
味スルモノデハナイカト、質問ニ答テ、私ハ一九三七年、昭
和十二年ニ聲明シタ我々、綱領ハ勿論ソレヲ全部網
羅スルモノデアルト述ベタ。中国カラ軍隊ヲ撤退サセ
ル問題ハ論争ノ骨子デアッタ。

日本ガ我々ノ原則ヲ受諾シ、且又會談ヲ續行
スル為、基礎ヲ與ヘル迄ニ行ク望ミハナイト云フ臆斷
ハ正ニイカト、質問ニ答テ、私ハソノ可能性ハ常ニアルガ
ド、程度、公算ガアルカハ云ヘナイト述ベタ。

日本ガ樞軸カラ、離脱ニ頑トシテ應ジナイコトガ立
證サレタカト、質問ニ對シテ、私ハ日本ハ今尚樞軸ニ
加盟シテ居ルト答ヘタ。

事態ハ日本側カラ言葉ヨリモ、寧ロ行動ヲ必要
トスルカト、質問ニ答テ、私ハ之ハ疑モナクサウデアル
ガ、実行ニ移スノニ必要ナル或ル種ノ了解ニ達
スルニハ第一ニ言葉ガ必要デアルト述ベタ。

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是等、南方へ軍事行動を日本側へ如何に説明スルカト
、質問ニ対シテ、私、彼等へ説明シテイト答ヘタ。

十一月廿八日、戦争會議ヲ私、我々が日本側ニ提示シタ十月
廿六日、提案ヲ吟味シ、且又日本側ノ了解が達成セラル可
能性が殆んど無いコトヲ指摘シタ。私、私見テ、日本、何時征
服、新行動ヲ起スカモ知シテイト、且又我が国、安全、自
衛、陸海軍、チニ存スルコトヲ強調シタ。私、我が国、軍事
的防衛計画、日本側が奇襲ヲ其、戦略、中絶矣トシ、
且又防衛及ビ調整ヲ擾乱スル目的、以テ各要所ヲ同時ニ
攻撃スルカモ知シテイト云フ假定ヲ含ムベキデアルトイフ私、判
断ヲ相互ノ敬意ヲ表シテ南陳シタ。

十一月廿九日、私、英大使ニモ大体同様、意見ヲ述ベタ。

私、當時、終始私が様ニタテテ教、人々ニ同様、コトヲ述ベタ。

十一月二十五日、印支支那、河内駐在、米國領事、日本
ハ十二月一日頃アラ、半島攻撃ヲ開始スル豫定デアルト、
報告ヲ本省ニ通知シテ来タ。彼、又更ニ之ヲ時々報告シ
タ上陸ニ加ヘテ新タタル部隊並ニ軍需品、印支支那上
陸ヲ報告シテ来タ。

十一月二十六日、ハサイゴン駐在、米國領事、同月概報、到
着部隊、補充トシテ更ニ南印支支那ニ日本、大増援部
隊が到着シタ事ヲ報告シテ来タ。十一月二十九日、國務省、
東南亞細亞ニ於ケル諸虫災撲滅ニ対シ、今後陸海軍、行
動ニ関スル情報、直接コトヲシ、合衆國亞細亞艦隊司令長

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官宛打電スル様訓令シテ。

十一月三十日英國大使ハ英國ハ日本ガ「シヤム」ヲ攻撃セシトシテ居リ。此ノ攻撃ハ「アラ」地峽ノ戰略的重要地矣ヲ奪取セムトスル海上遠征ヲ企及ムルヲアルト云フ重要ナル徵候ヲ得テアルト私ニ言フ。

十一月三十日ノ某條首相ハ大政翼賛會及ビ大日本輿論同盟主催ノ國民大會ニ演説ヲ祝辭ノ中テ次ノ如ク述べタ。

「蔣政権ハ或ハ英米ノ煽動ニ左右セラレ、或ハ共産黨ノ宣傳ニ踊リミタリニ抗戦ヲ叫ンデ前途有望ノ青年ヲ空シク大元セシメツアルトハ大至亞民族ヲテ相食マシメソノ間隙ニ乘リ英米兩國ガ「アジア」制覇ノ野心ヲ逞シクセントスルモノデアツテカクノ如キハ由來英米兩國ノ常套手段トスルトコロデアル。

我々人類ノ名譽ノ為ニ人類矜持ノ為ニ斷ジテコレヲ徹底的ニ排撃シテケレバアラフ。

ソノ日即チ十一月三十日ノ曜日ニ、日本ノ總理大臣ノ好戰的聲明ト極東情勢ノ重大化ニ因リ我々軍部ト協議ノ後、私ハ「ウォームスプリングス」ニ居テ大統領ニ電話ヲ掛ケ「フリント」ヲ歸還ノ日ヲ繰リ上げル様ニ勸メタ。依ッテ大統領ハ十二月一日「フリント」ニ歸還シタ。

十二月二日大統領ハ印カ支那ニ於ル日本軍隊ノ繼續的移動理由ニ對シ日本大使並ニ來栖氏ニ直々ニ面ヒ訊ス様指令シタ。

十二月三日ノ記者團トノ会見ニ於テ私ハ十一月二十七日ニ私ガ言及シテ諸君ノ或部分ニ對シモウ一ハ吟味シタ。私ハ十一月カラ豫備的ニ他ノ方法ニテモ問題ヲ決定スル占天ニ付何等ノ進捗ヲモ見テ居ナイト云ツタ。

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十二月五日、日本大使が訪レ十二月二日、大統領、
質問ニ對スル回答ヲ提出シテ、ソレハ日本増援部
隊、中國上境ヲ接スル地域ニ在ル中國軍ニ對ス
ル警戒的措置トシテ印度支那ニ派遣セラレタト
言フモラシイ聲明ヲ含シテ居リ。

十二月六日我が政府ハ輸送船三十五隻巡洋
艦八隻及び駆逐艦二十隻ヨリ成ル日本艦隊
、印度支那カラマラ、海峡へ、移動、報告
ヲ教テ、助ケラセタ。コレハ長、間脅威シ
日本、南方へ、武力ニ依ル膨張運動ヲ進行
中デアルト、確證デアル。合衆國及び其、友邦
ヲ共通、差違ツテ危険ニ置キ、此、進展、危
急的性質ハ我々全部、念頭ニ深ク置カレ又當
日及び其、翌日、陸海軍代表ト私ト、會談、主
題デアル。

十二月六日、ルーズヴェルト、大統領ハ日本天皇ニ宛
テ、事態、悲劇的可能性ヲ避クルべク直接懇
請ヲ打電ス。

十二月七日、日本軍ハ真珠灣ヲ攻撃シテ。

真珠灣ニ於テ極点ニ達シテ危急、數年間待
最後、數ヶ月間ニ於テ、大統領國務長官陸海兩
長官並ニ軍部首腦者、相互ニ絶エズ接觸ヲ保
テ、未タ情報及び意見、交換ハ最も自由ニ行ハレタ。
電話ヲ取上ゲテ呼出人ガ相手方ニ狀態ニ何カ新シ

No. 30

重要トコトハナリト尋ネテ、又呼出人が持ッテ居ル新ニイ
情報ヲ傳ヘル等、我々ハ之ヲ通例セフテ来リ、デ
アツタ。是等、情報及ビ意見、交換ハ閣議及
ビ一九四一年（昭和十六年）秋中ニ開カレテ戰
争會議、會合並ニ他、数多、會談ニ於テ論
議セラレタモ、外ニ行ハレテ、デアル。

一九四一年／昭和十六年十一月二十日カラ十二月
七日ニ至ル特ニ危急デアツノ期間中、我が陸海
軍兩省、將校ト保ツテ接觸、例證トシテ、私ハ
私、事務室ニ於テ記入シタ月日、用務簿カラ
作成シタ是等、代表者達ト詰ツテ時、記録
ヲ添附スル（附屬書類A）。ソ、記録ハ勿論
完全デハナイカモシレタイ。

更ニ私ハ一九四〇年（昭和十五年）十月カラ一九
四一年／昭和十六年十二月七日迄ニ、私が陸海
軍兩省、代表者ト談合セル時、記録、報告
書ヲ添附スル（附屬書類B）。

私ハ更ニ一九四〇年（昭和十五年）乃至一九四
一年／昭和十六年／間ニ國務省ト陸海軍
兩省ト、間、接觸ニ関スル取扱、報告書ヲ
モ添附スル。

（附屬書類C）。 （以下次頁へ）

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以上ニ依リテ私ハ我が國ト日本トノ間ニ起リ
事項、特ニ此、共同委員會、所質問ニ關係ス
ル事項ヲ簡單ニ述ベ且、分析シヨウト努ム。若
シ我が國、關係、中、此、陳述ニ減シテナル部分
ニ関シ私が明ラカニスル事、出来ルモ、ガアルトラバ私
ハ喜ミテ、レシキタイ。

(第七卷、第二八九乃至二九〇頁)

「ゲゼル」氏一報テ丁度其、頃「スチムソン」長官
ハ十一月二十五日ニ白亞館ヲ會議ガアソクト
報告シテナル、ソ、會議ニハ、貴殿「ワフス」長
官「スチムソン」氏「マシーナル陸軍大將」「スターク」
海軍大將ガ出席シタ。彼ハ其處テ次、如ク云
ツテ居ル。

「大統領」ハ日本側トノ關係ヲ持タダシタ。彼ハ
オシラク、若シカシク、ラ末週、月曜日ニテモ代
ルハ攻撃サレルカモ知シ又場合ヲ持出シタ。何故
ナラバ日本人ハ豫告ナシニ攻撃スルコトニ有名ニ
ナルカ、ソ、ミテ問題ハ我々、何ヲ爲スベキカ、トアル。
我々ハ一般問題ニ関シ協議シタ。

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貴殿ハ其ノ時或ハ其頃一般問題ニ關シ如何ニスベキカ
ト云フ事ニツイテ戦争會議トノ協議ヲ記憶シテ居ラレカ
ハル氏——其頃又其ノ後私ノ考ヘテ居ル主要点ハ
日本カ如何ニ會議ニ真劍ニ參加ヲ續ケル見込ハ殆ブ
ト無イト云フ事デアラク我々ハ彼等カ最後通牒ニ決
シタバカリナク、二十五日ニ會議ヲ打テ切ル事ヲ命ジテ事
ヲ俟受通信ニ依テ知ツテキタルアル、ソレヲ遂ニ彼等
ハ二十日以後ハ速答ヲ求ムルヲ強テ病氣ニスル程ニ堪
マシタ

（第九卷第一四七三頁）

副議長——ソレハ貴殿ハ十一月二十日ノ日本ノ提案ヲ
最後通牒ソノモトナヘラレタカ

ハル氏——然ハ、文書デモ曰頭デモサウ言ワツテソレ
テ我々ハソノ性質ソノモカウレサウトシカ考ムラシエカツ
副議長——ソコデ十一月二十六日ノ貴殿ノ回答ハ何等
カノ意味ニ於テ最後通牒デアラカ

ハル氏——サア、本當ノ事ヲ云ハバ我々カ此ノ席上デ
屢々述ベタ通り我々ハ會議ヲ續行スル事ヲ非モ
望ムテ居タル、又我々ハソレヲ進ムル事ヲ望ム、今ニ動機ヲ
持ツテ居タルソレ我々ハ之等ノ線ニ沿ヒテ之ヲ國際
關係ノ普通通商中ノ次第トシテ提案シタルソレテ
國務省ノ凡テノ人々大統領其他ノ人々ハ比白意見ガ
一致ニ居タト思フ、又私カ云フ通り日本側モスグニ道ヲ

